

Walter Chatton on Future Contingents: The *Lectura* Account

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In this paper I present Walter Chatton's *Lectura* I d. 17 q. 5, a discussion of the issue of "whether the wayfarer can be certain that he himself has perpetual charity." In the course of discussing this question, Chatton presents an approach to the problem of future contingents which I had overlooked in Bornholdt 2017 and which closely resembles some aspects of his approach in his later *Quodlibet*.² In what follows, I will summarize the relevant parts of the Question, attempt a general description of Chatton's *Lectura* theory, discuss some outstanding difficulties in interpretation, and then review the implications this theory has for my interpretation of his doctrine or doctrines in Bornholdt 2017: 233–258 and the associated commentary. My interpretation is followed by a translation of the entire Question.

Chatton begins by presenting a series of twelve doubts; these are highly problematic test cases that call into question God's ability to reveal to the wayfarer that he will be finally saved. Doubts 5–9 have to do with paradoxes of action and knowledge that arguably make it impossible to reveal a future sin to an initially sinless agent, e.g., an angel; since these matters are essentially extraneous to the problem of future contingents, I will not discuss them, or Chatton's reactions to them, in this context. (They are, however, included in the translation below.) The basic logical structure of most of the relevant doubts, i.e., 1–4 and 11–12, depends on a modalized *modus ponens* inference of the following form:

1. Necessarily, P
2. Necessarily, (if P, then Q)
3. Therefore: Necessarily, Q

Premise 1 is God's informative action, whereby a wayfarer is made aware, presumably in a trustworthy manner, of his own future action or state; premise 2 is the *consequentia* or conditional sentence licensing the inference that the prophesied or announced event will take place; and premise 3 expresses the necessity of the prophesied event itself. In each case, the divine act of apprising the wayfarer of his future state or action is held to be necessary (and therefore unchangeable) in accordance with the principle of the necessity of the present and past; the inference is rock-solid, as it simply gives the rule of correspondence between God's act of informing and contents of that act; and the future state or action of the wayfarer is thus necessitated, leading to deeply counterintuitive results that seem to deprive the wayfarer of the freedom to sin (or not to sin, as the case may be). So runs the content of Doubts 1–3 and 11. Alternatively, if we choose to insist on the freedom of the wayfarer, we may negate and switch premises 1 and 3 of the argument above:

1. Not necessarily, Q
2. Necessarily, (if P, then Q)
3. Therefore: Not necessarily, P

¹ This is an updated version of a draft originally published on Academia.edu in April 2019. I have profited greatly from discussion with colleagues at the 5th Rio Colloquium on Logic and Metaphysics in the Later Middle Ages, held at the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro on June 24th–26th, 2019.

² The *Lectura* is dated to 1323–24 (ed. Wey and Etzkorn 2007: vii); the *Quodlibet*, to c. 1330 (Keele 2007: 668–78).

Since our future action is not necessitated, it follows that we can change the past, which had (reasonably enough) seemed to be safely necessitated. So runs the content of Doubts 4 and 12. The latter also raises the possibility that God (in this case, Christ) was mistaken. Doubt 10 is an outlier; it does not depend on the inference above, but rather denies the possibility that the wayfarer be informed of the future, on the grounds that God, because omnipotent, can cause false beliefs and infuse false propositions in the minds of his creatures.

After taking note of the logical possibility of an affirmative answer to the question, which implies that God can indeed so inform a wayfarer, Chatton reviews three attempts to solve the problems expressed by the doubts. The first attempt, comprising sections 14–19 of the Question, is the theory described in Bornholdt 2017: 236–246 as the “Contingency of Signification.” According to this theory, the meaning of prophetic utterances can change in retrospect depending on the action of the prophecy’s recipient: although Christ told Peter “You will deny me,” Peter was still free to remain true to Christ, whereupon the conceptual content of “You will deny me” would be retrospectively reinterpreted as its own negation. The example, and substantial portions of the texts of sections 14–19 themselves, appear almost unchanged in *Quodlibet* q. 27, sections 5–10 and 15.³ Chatton’s response is the same here as there: by dissolving the bonds linking concept and object, he claims, the theory renders all prophecy suspect and dissolves the distinction between dogma and heresy; thus it must of course be rejected.

The second attempted solution, presented in section 20, seems at first blush highly similar to the first; here, too, the literal meaning of prophetic utterances is no guarantee that the prophecy will occur as stated, and *ex post facto* reinterpretation of the meaning of the utterance is used to make the prophecy accurate in retrospect. There is, however, a crucial difference between the two solutions, as becomes clear by a review of the responses offered to the second solution in sections 21–28. While the first solution constituted an attempt to sever concept and object, the second leaves the concept-object link firmly in place and tries to revoke the merely imposed, arbitrary meaning of the words used. Unlike the first solution, which constituted a violation of basic semantic theory, this strategy is in principle possible, but it gives rise to unacceptable epistemological and theological consequences. After all, argues Chatton, the prophecy meant what it meant at the time; hence, on the opinion under review, it is in our power to make Scripture inauthentic and falsify the representative knowledge given to us by God (section 21); make God a liar (22); deceive God (23); deprive God of the ability to make humans certain about future contingents (24); force God into contradictions (25); violate trans-temporal truth (26); and make the divine will unjust (27–28).

The first two solutions both rely on the “contingency of the consequence”: that is, they rely on replacing the second premise in the modalized *modus ponens* argument with “Contingently, (if P, then Q)” while leaving the first premise unchanged. Not so the third solution, which is none other than Chatton’s Copulative Analysis, presented here as a variant of the “Ockhamist” future-dependency escape clause.⁴ Here, the consequence is necessary, while the antecedent is contingent in virtue of its future-dependent second clause. Besides a regress argument (section 32), Chatton rejects this solution on the grounds that it implies

³ Translated in Bornholdt 2017: 319–321.

⁴ In the Copulative Analysis, divine-knowledge propositions such as “God knows that Socrates will sit” come out as “God cognizes ‘Socrates will sit / not sit’; and Socrates will sit.” Since the second conjunct is contingent, so is the whole complex. The future-dependency escape clause, often wrongly fathered on Ockham (who used it extensively, but did not invent it), constitutes an exception to the necessity of the past in the case of propositions dependent for their truth on the contingent future; for example, “Yesterday, it was true that you will sin tomorrow.” For the Copulative Analysis, see Bornholdt 2017: 183–7; for the prehistory of the “Ockhamist” escape clause, see Marenbon 2005: 106 and Wciórka 2018.

backward causation *ex parte creaturae* in the case of divine guarantees. If we hold both the (natural) concept-object link and the (imposed) word-concept link constant, all that can change retroactively are the substantive facts referred to by the (past-necessitated) prophecy; hence, if God has promised me salvation just in case I kill a pagan, and I have indeed killed a pagan, my continued freedom to be damned implies that I can somehow retroactively un-kill the pagan, which is absurd (section 31).

Finally, in sections 33–34, he presents his own preferred approach to the problem, which runs as follows. Future contingents must be divided into two classes, governed by two rules:

Rule 1. In the first class of future contingents, the defining rule is that the modal link between P and Q is absolute: no power can sever it. Such is the relation between the contents of the divine cognition and the things, events, and states of affairs grasped by that cognition: if God cognizes Peter’s future denial of Christ, then Peter will deny Christ. In such a case, Peter’s freedom is preserved by assuming that until the denial itself, the cognition of the denial remains contingent.

Rule 2. In the second class of future contingents, the defining rule is that the modal link between P and Q is strong but can, in principle, be severed by some power; it is conceptually (and in some sense conatively) possible that P can happen and Q nonetheless be avoided. Chatton’s examples (one of which appears in the *Quodlibet*) have to do with concretized prophecy (e.g., an actual token-sentence such as “You will deny me”) and specific actions taken as part of a divine guarantee of eventual salvation or future sin. On the assumption that God has caused in me knowledge that I would receive eventual blessedness just in case I kill a pagan, and I have in fact killed a pagan, two things follow: (a) my killing of the pagan is past-necessitated; (b) I can indeed act so as to rescind the conditional guarantee. Hence, in this context Chatton embraces the contingency of the consequence, which he rejects for theories of prophecy.

Rule 1 is in need of considerable analysis and explanation, as it seems to preserve the contingency of the consequent (and thus creaturely freedom) by allowing backward causation. Given the apparently radical character of this expedient, it is far from obvious that it avoids the problems that beset the three solutions discussed above, not to mention the worries mentioned in doubts 1–4 and 10–12. Responding to such worries (set forth in 39–41), Chatton makes it clear that while God can indeed cause false propositions in creaturely minds, He cannot, by common or instituted law, lie, since lying implies the absence of the intent to make a creature certain of the proposition’s contents (42–44, 71). The implication for the contingency of divine utterances and cognition is not entirely clear, but it seems to be amenable to two readings, corresponding perhaps to two different types of contingents falling under the rule.

On the first reading, the content of such utterances and cognition need not be (so to speak) in a state of superposition until the cognized or prophesied event takes place; the past need not really be changed. Rather, the contingency involved could be the relatively low-octane variety provided by the various purposes God might have to instill this or that proposition, assent, or cognition in a creaturely mind. As we cannot always be certain that we have interpreted God’s intent correctly, a given proposition instilled in our minds directly—say, “You will deny me”—may turn out to have meant something other than it seemed to mean (cf. *Quodlibet* q. 28 [5]–[6], [30]⁵).

On the other hand, there are passages in which a much more radical kind of modality seems indeed to be in play. In section 76, Chatton, having dispatched a Rule 2 objection by

⁵ Translated in Bornholdt 2017: 332–3, 338.

appealing to the *de facto* guarantee provided by common or disposed law (for which see below), responds to the following riposte: Given that common law guarantees the threefold denial, was it not in Peter's power that there be a *different instituted law*? Chatton responds that it was indeed "in Peter's power that there have been another law by distinction [*alietati*] of the willed object, though not by distinction of the will"; the divine will cannot in any sense be influenced by creatures, but its object can in some sense be changed or defined. Here, at any rate, two radical possibilities seem to be mooted: first, that the alternative *lex instituta* that is within the wayfarer's power is one in which Christ can lie; and second, that that alternative law is one in which the utterance *tu me negabis* has shifted in retrospect and transformed into its own contradiction. Chatton immediately goes on (76) to appeal to the *sensus compositus* / *sensus divisus* distinction in order to stanch worries associated with Peter's power to make God utter a falsehood; perhaps such a distinction is held to apply to the modality associated with Rule 1 as well as Rule 2, and to block the possibility of Christ lying in *any* possible world. The other possibility is more intriguing, namely that Peter, in the spirit of the first rejected solution (sections 14-19), can sever the link of linguistic *institutio* that joins spoken utterance and conceptual content. *Institutio* is, after all, arbitrary and modally local; perhaps Chatton wants to suggest that it is within Peter's power to retroactively associate *tu me negabis* with some other conceptual content, and have that conceptual content submitted to the strict conditional yielding the predicted event. If this is what Chatton means, then both past and future are, in the limited area of linguistic *institutio*, in the domain of Peter's free action. Once again, it is not clear how such a reading would avoid the problems associated with the three rejected solutions.

Rule 2 is much more straightforward. Chatton devotes less space to the future contingents falling under this rule, but it is clear that the worries are of a similar nature; the danger is that God's promise or prediction will be violated. Here, too, common law comes to the rescue: though it is conceivable that the concretized prophecy "You will deny me" will be violated, common law guarantees that it will not be (75). Peter is capable of remaining steadfast only in the sense that there is nothing contradictory about his doing so; but given that, under current law, Christ's utterance meant unambiguously that he would deny Him, he is not capable of making Christ a liar. Peter can remain steadfast—hence he is responsible for his eventual sin—but he will not.

It is worth noting that here, as in the *Quodlibet*, the concretized prediction "You will deny me" is pressed into service for both the contingency of the consequence and that of the antecedent (if I am reading Chatton correctly). Given that the locus of common law is the divine will, which cannot fail of its object, this seems like a case for Rule 1 contingency. But the example is the same. And this makes sense: after all, Christ's prediction is not only a concretized utterance, but also a communication from the divine mind, and thus subject to Rule 1. In many cases, then, the distinction between Rule 1 and Rule 2 future contingents is perhaps ultimately a technical one; the question is not "What constitutes the wayfarer's freedom?" but rather "What is the conceptual structure undergirding the wayfarer's freedom in this or that case, under this or that description?"

The model of the world implied by these two rules makes a complex and unstable impression. Rule 2 implies that there is a single real world, a final cut of reality, represented by *lex instituta*. This is, presumably, the world in which we find ourselves. In this world, we are free to perform or not perform a variety of actions, although there is, even now, a matter of fact regarding our actual future choice. This is a form of logical compatibilism: although I will perform a given action tomorrow, there are paths leading into alternate futures that stand as truth-makers for the claim that I am responsible for what I do, since in a modally broader (though unreal) sense I could do otherwise. Rule 1 implies that there are alternatives to the actual world implied by Rule 2, and that these alternatives are within our modal grasp in some

way differing from the unreal paths in the actual world: it stands within our power to exchange the branching modal map of the real world with a different map, governed by different rules. It is unclear, at least to me, whether our modal access to these alternative *leges institutae* is ontologically strong or merely notional. If the former, then the stability granted by the current *lex instituta* seems to go lost, while if the latter, then we have model comprising two logical-compatibilist sub-models, associated with two different kinds of action on the wayfarer's part. Further work is needed in this area in order to grasp what Chatton intends here.

A comparison of the *Lectura* and the *Quodlibet* treatment of future contingents reveals broad similarity and nuanced differences. In both texts, Chatton reviews a series of opinions and challenges on the subject of future contingents which eventually yield a reaction in the form of the "contingent antecedent" / "contingent consequence" distinction. In the *Lectura*, as in the *Quodlibet*, the challenges focus on problems associated with concretized prophecy and the Contingency of Signification, while in the *Quodlibet* they also include a long discussion of vision in the Word and a pass-in-review of fifteen further opinions on the subject of future contingents. The doctrine of the *Lectura*, as set forth in sections 33 and 34, is highly similar but not identical to that of the final sections of the *Quodlibet*; in both cases, Chatton draws a distinction between (i) the contingency of the antecedent, which pertains to the truth-status of non-concretized propositional or assent tokens of future contingents imparted to the wayfarer by God and directly dependent on His cognition, and (ii) the contingency of the consequence, which pertains to something else. The salient difference between the *Lectura* and *Quodlibet* versions of the theory has to do with that "something else": in the *Lectura*, it consists of concretized prophecies and specific actions taken by the wayfarer as part of a divine guarantee of final blessedness or future sin; in the *Quodlibet*, it is illustrated by concretized prophecy alone, in this case the propositional token "You will deny me thrice." Moreover, in the *Lectura*, the freedom of the wayfarer to falsify the consequence is left relatively undiscussed, with the legitimacy of the consequence (though contingent) expressed in terms of "common" or "instituted law," where the latter is read as an actual guarantee that the future event will take place (even though it need not in some modally broader sense); while in the *Quodlibet*, the legitimacy of the consequence is also expressed in terms of "common law," but the latter is cashed out in terms of causal tendencies, with the suggestion that the wayfarer's freedom is preserved by the merely dispositional character of those causal tendencies.

The main implications of these *Lectura* sections for the interpretations offered in Bornholdt 2017: 233–258, and the associated commentary at 463–468, are as follows. If we assume that the dating of the *Lectura* and the *Quodlibet* is accurate, Chatton, in reacting to the fifteen theories of future contingents listed and discussed in qq. 28–29 of his *Quodlibet*, is not constructing his late theory of future contingents while reacting to these various theories (which had been my assumption); instead, he is using the dichotomized approach already developed in the *Lectura* as an organizing principle to classify traditional theories into coherent groups. Furthermore, given that several years intervene between the composition of the *Lectura* and that of the *Quodlibet*, it seems that the distinction between Rule 1 and Rule 2 future contingents does indeed constitute Chatton's settled opinion on the question. The chaos and unease that characterize Chatton's obsessive engagement with future contingents in the *Reportatio* have given way to a solution (albeit an ambiguous one) in the form of two rules for two different kinds of contingency, and Chatton seems satisfied with this solution.

**Translation of Walter Chatton's *Lectura*, Book I, Distinction 17, Question 5:
Whether the wayfarer can be certain that he himself has perpetual charity⁶**

Fifth, I ask whether the wayfarer, being capable of sin, can be certain by divine revelation that he himself has perpetual charity.⁷

[Twelve doubts motivating the question. Doubt 1:]

1. This question is motivated by twelve doubts. First, it seems that if it were so [i.e., if the wayfarer could be certain of perpetual charity although capable of sin], God would not be able to annihilate this wayfarer. I argue thus: "This human was certain that this charity would belong to him perpetually, therefore this human will not be annihilated." This consequence is necessary, since God cannot act so that the consequence is not good, and the antecedent is necessary in that God cannot act so that that proposition be false. Therefore the consequent is necessary in that God cannot act so that that consequent be false. That the consequence is necessary is clear, since the opposite of the consequent necessarily contradicts the antecedent. That the antecedent is necessary in this way is clear, since God does not have it in His power that the past, after it [has become] past, never have been; therefore if this certainty was ever in the mind of this wayfarer, it follows that God cannot now act so that that certainty not be in his mind; and in consequence, the antecedent is necessary.

[Doubt 2:]

2. Secondly, I argue the same [position] under this form: God made this human believe that his charity would be perpetuated, therefore this human will not be annihilated. The antecedent is now just as necessary as the proposition "God made the world"; and the consequence is so necessary that God cannot impede it, since in that case He could act so that the antecedent was true while the consequent was false; and consequently God could make a human assent to something false, and deceive humans, and lie, which [things] are absurd. – I confirm this. This consequence is necessary: God made him believe that his charity would be perpetuated by a belief [*dubitare*] by which He willed to make him certain about a future thing, therefore this human will not be annihilated; and the antecedent is necessary; therefore [also] the consequent.

[Doubt 3:]

3. Third, if a human were certain that he himself would have perpetual charity, it would seem then that he himself would not be able to sin. For when he is thus certain, let him say to his neighbor "I have perpetual charity." Then I argue: This one said to his neighbor "I have perpetual charity"; therefore he has perpetual charity. The antecedent is necessary and the consequence is necessary, since either it is now in his power that he should commit a mortal sin and lose that charity, or not. If not, we have what we proposed. If so, therefore it is now in his power that he previously lied; and more, therefore it is now in his power that he then was without any charity; and consequently, he was not then certain that he had actual charity, and

⁶ My translation is based on the text of Wey and Etzkorn 2009: 355-377, from which I have also taken over cross-references in the text, as well as references to Anselm and Augustine. Headers and text in brackets indicate both my and the editors' interpolations.

⁷ *Caritas* is used in the sense of *gratia*. The question is whether the wayfarer can know that he is among the saved.

[thus] all the more was he not certain that then he had *perpetual* charity; therefore from the first [doubt] [i.e., therefore the conclusion from the first doubt is also applicable here].

[Doubt 4:]

4. Fourth, given this, it would be conceded that after you have killed a human, it would still be in your power that you would never have killed him. For let God make you certain that if you have perpetual charity, He will permit you to kill one pagan, and if not, afterwards you will not have killed a pagan.⁸ Then I argue: at some time you have killed that unbelieving human, therefore at some time you have had perpetual charity. It is not in your power that this consequence not be good, since you would not have killed him if you had not had perpetual charity in accordance with the [stated conditions of] the case. If therefore it be now in your power that the consequent be false, it follows that now it is in your power that the antecedent is false.

[Doubt 5:]

5. Fifth, I argue thus: it cannot be maintained simultaneously that Peter, before his denial of Christ, should have had it in his power not to deny Christ, and that nevertheless he should have been certain that he would deny Him; just as the following two are inconsistent: (a) that someone can deny God and (b) that nevertheless he is certain that he himself will not deny Him or that he will remain in perpetual charity without sin. I prove the antecedent, since Peter was not certain that he himself would deny Christ, as is clear from Matthew [26: 35]: “Though I should die with thee, yet will I not deny thee.” And he could not be certain about this [that is, about the future denial] if he could have avoided it, since if he had been certain about that future denial, he would have had to grieve over and resist [*nolere*] it, and would have continued to resist it; and consequently, he was not able to avoid that denial, and thus, in denying, he would not have sinned.

[Doubt 6:]

6. Sixth, I argue by the argument of Anselm, *De casu diaboli* ch. 21, where he proves that the evil angel, before his fall, could not foreknow his own future fall, since if he had done so, he would therefore have done so either [while] willing his future fall or [while] not willing [it]. If [while] willing [it], then he sinned before he sinned; if [while] not willing [it], then it follows that the more just he was, the more miserable he was in his punishment, since the more just,⁹ the more he would have grieved over that future fall; and in consequence, the more he would have been afflicted by the punishment of sadness; but the consequent is false, since the more just he had been, the more he must have been happier, and the less [he would have been] subject to punishment.

7. And Anselm confirms this there, since if [the devil] had foreknown his fall, either he would have thought about that future [event] by compulsion or spontaneously. Not by compulsion, since thus he would not have thought that he would sin. If spontaneously, then he would have known that it was in his power to have avoided that sin; and consequently he would not have known whether the future [event] was one which he would in fact avoid or not. From these [considerations] I argue thus: the wayfarer cannot be made certain of his own perpetual fall,

⁸ Cf. *Quodlibet* q. 28 [2], tr. in Bornholdt 2017: 332.

⁹ Wey and Etzkorn 2009 read [*in*] *iustior* [sic], but *iustior* makes sense in context.

therefore not of his own perpetual charity either. The antecedent is proved, and the consequence is plain.

[Doubt 7:]

8. Seventh, I argue with Augustine, I *Retractationum*, chapter 8,¹⁰ every punishment, if it is just, is a punishment of sin. From this it seems to follow that no punishment can be inflicted without a fault; but if someone capable of deserving [salvation], existing without a fault, could be certain of his own future perpetual fall, then without any blame on his part he himself would be in a great punishment of sadness and pain, which would be unjust; and consequently, capable of meriting [salvation], he cannot be made certain of his own perpetual fall, since then, without any sin, he would despair, because he would believe that he would not be saved; and consequently his despair would not be a sin.

[Doubt 9:]¹¹

9. Ninth, I argue thus: if he can be made certain of his own perpetual charity, then [he can] also [be made certain] about his perseverance in the good; therefore he would be made certain that he himself would not be able to sin, since perseverance cannot be lost according to Augustine, *De dono perseverantiae*.¹² And I prove by reason, since if a human were to lose his perseverance in the good, he would not previously have had perpetual perseverance in the good.

[Doubt 10:]

10. Tenth, I ask how a human can be made certain about perpetual charity. Not without either the proposition “you have perpetual charity” being revealed to him, or by making him believe that his charity was perpetual. But neither of these suffices, since God can cause false propositions, and can make a human believe something false. For since he is omnipotent, it seems that he could cause such an act of belief, and also such false propositions.

[Doubt 11:]

11. Eleventh, I argue thus: the following consequence is necessary: “This one was certain that his charity will be perpetual, therefore his charity will be perpetual,” since the opposite of the consequent contradicts the antecedent. And the antecedent is necessary, therefore [also] the consequent. That the antecedent is necessary I prove, since all true propositions about the past that depend on futures that are equally contingent are equally necessary or non-necessary; but one such [proposition] is necessary, therefore any given one [is necessary]. The assumption is clear, since this [proposition] was necessary before Peter’s denial: “Christ said to Peter, ‘You will deny me,’” and nevertheless that [proposition] depended then on Peter’s future denial, since if that denial had not been going-to-be, Christ never would have said this; therefore, etc.

[Doubt 12:]

¹⁰ CSEL 36, 44-45; <https://archive.org/stream/corpuscriptoru25wisssgoog#page/n73/mode/2up>

¹¹ Doubt 8 is missing; see below for response, sections 64-65, 68.

¹² PL 45, 993-995;

http://pld.chadwyck.co.uk/all/fulltext?ALL=Y&ACTION=byid&warn=N&div=4&id=Z400049197&FILE=../session/1552675717_5065&CURDB=pld

12. Twelfth, I argue thus: it was in Peter's power that the saying of Christ should be false, therefore there follow two problems [*inconvenientia*]. The first is that it is not only possible from the absolute power of God, but also by instituted law [i.e., by *potentia ordinata*], that Christ should have spoken falsely. The second problem is that it would be possible that the proposition by which God wishes to make a human certain about the truth be false.

[Response of the author to the question:]

To this question I suppose two things. First, I suppose that the question would ask about the possibility of sinning mortally. Second, I suppose that the mortal sin is not compossible with charity [=grace].

13. Supposing these things, the title of the question can be distinguished according composition and division. Indeed, some of its terms are acceptable for those things that exist, and simultaneously for those things that can be. I intend nevertheless to inquire about this interpretation [*quaerere ad istum intellectum*], sc. whether [the following] proposition is possible: "The wayfarer, being able to commit mortal sin, firmly assents by divine revelation that he himself has perpetual charity." And on this interpretation of the question, it can be said: yes, [the proposition is possible,] since nothing can be denied as "possible for God" which yields no [logical] repugnancy; but matters stand thus in the issue at hand [*in proposito*]; therefore, etc.

14.¹³ Nevertheless, with respect to the solutions of the [preceding] arguments, there are [various] opinions, as is clear about the argument of Peter's denial during the time between that denial and the revelation made to him by Christ, if it is argued thus: "Christ said that Peter was going to deny him, therefore Peter was going to deny him." The antecedent was necessary [for] the intervening time, since it was a true past-tense proposition, and the consequence was then necessary, since otherwise it would be possible that the opposite of the consequence would be true with the antecedent, and in consequence it would have been possible that Christ said that something would be true which would not be true, which is incongruous; therefore it follows that the consequent was necessary, and in consequence Peter afterwards would not have sinned in by denying [Christ].

[Opinion of others:]

15. To this argument and to other, very similar ones, some say that the consequence is contingent, and that the opposite of the consequent can stand with the antecedent, sc. that Christ would have said that proposition, and nevertheless that Peter would not have been going-to-deny Christ. Nor does it therefore follow that the [proposition] "Christ said something false" would be possible. For although it would then have been necessary for Christ to have said that proposition, nevertheless that proposition both in voice and in mind signified *contingently* that things would be thus—for if Peter had not been going to deny Christ, then that proposition would not have signified that Peter was going to deny Christ, but would have signified the opposite of this—therefore it does not follow that the proposition 'Christ said something false' would have been possible.

[Against this opinion.]

¹³ Sections 14–19 appear almost verbatim in *Quodlibet* q. 27, sections 5–10 and 15 (tr. Bornholdt 2017 319–321).

16. Against this. First, this response must concede many absurdities, sc. that it be possible that this article of faith in the mind “God is three and one” is false, since it is possible that the concepts in the mind from which that proposition is composed fall away from their significates and signify the same as with the terms of the proposition “a man is an ass.” Indeed, it follows that any given article of faith in the mind can be a proposition which never would be possible. And it follows that faith, with respect to all the articles, could be heresy, and that first principles in the intellect can be false, and that knowledge can be error, and that charity can be idolatry, and that no possible certitude can be had about anything that cannot also be had with respect to its contradictory, since all those things, both act and disposition, both intellect and will, can remain, and nevertheless not be of those objects of which they were previously, but of others. For an act or a disposition of the will is not more essentially of its object than is an act or disposition or intellect with respect to itself. Indeed, nobody could tell a lie that was not capable of having been the truth.

17. I confirm this by a proposition posited in the beginning of the third distinction. Let Socrates apprehend the stone, and let Plato then form any kind of very similar apprehension which is nevertheless not of the stone, just as you claim is possible. In that case, the indefinite proposition “a human being apprehends the stone” is true for Socrates and not [true] for Plato. But the passing of time is [not] the cause because of which [this proposition] is not true for Plato, since they are simultaneous; nor is local movement the cause, nor the generation or corruption of any thing belonging to the one but not to the other; for on both sides things are very similar in every respect, as I suppose; therefore no reason, it seems, may be assigned for which that proposition is not [also] true for Plato; and it is posited that [the proposition] is *not* true for Plato; therefore it is posited thus without any possible reason.

18. If it be said that the understanding of the stone does not represent the stone, but Socrates’ intellection represents the stone:¹⁴ Against: I argue just as before, since this indefinite proposition “a human being’s apprehension represents the stone” is true for the intention of Socrates and not for the intention of Plato; therefore, some reason [for the difference in truth-value] must be assigned; and I argue about that [reason] just as before, and thus to infinity, unless it be admitted that the intellection of Plato cannot be in every respect similar to the intellection of Socrates with respect to [the] existence and essence [of the stone], unless there were an intellection of the stone, and that is what was proposed.

19. Secondly, I prove against the opinion [=15] that even if it is posited, the difficulty of the argument is not avoided, since assuming that that proposition which was in Christ’s mind could have remained [the same] while no [longer] signifying that Peter would deny [Him], nevertheless this [proposition] was then necessary: “This proposition once signified that Peter would deny Christ,” and Christ then asserted it; therefore Christ once asserted that Peter would deny Him. And then the argument “Christ once asserted that Peter would deny Him, therefore Peter was going-to-deny Him” is valid. The antecedent is necessary, and the consequence is necessary, otherwise the opposite [of the consequent] could stand [with the antecedent]; and thus it would have been possible that Christ had at some time said a falsehood.

¹⁴ Note the difference between this text and that in *Quodlibet* q. 27 [9]: *Si DICATUR quod intellectio Platonis non repraesentat lapidem sicut intellectio Sortis repraesentat lapidem et ideo non est simile* (ed. Etzkorn and Keele, forthcoming).

[Opinion of others:]

20. Others say that every true proposition about the past is necessary, even to the degree that God cannot act now so that it be false. And therefore they say that in such arguments, the consequence is contingent, and that the antecedent can be true without the consequent, and therefore that in all such matters it must be conceded that the [propositions] “God says a falsehood” [and] “God deceives humans” are possible. Nevertheless it does not follow from this that the [proposition] “God lies” is possible, since lying implies imperfection in the one who lies.

[Against this opinion:]

21. Against this opinion. If every true proposition about the past is necessary, many absurdities follow. First it follows from this that it is in the power of any human that Sacred Scripture not be authentic, for Scripture is not authentic unless all knowledge that God causes for making a human certain about a signified thing is true; but it is in the power of any human to act [in such a way] that it be false; therefore, etc. I prove the assumption from examples [*ex datis*]. For let God, in order to make me certain of my own future sitting, cause in me representational knowledge of me sitting tomorrow. Then I argue thus: [the following argument] is valid: “God caused in me, in order to make me certain of my own future sitting, representative knowledge of me going-to-sit; therefore, I was going-to-sit.” It is in my power that the consequent be false. Therefore, if the antecedent is necessary, it follows that it is in my power that the consequence not hold, and thus that the antecedent be true without the consequent; and consequently, it is in my power that God, in order to make me certain about that thing, should cause false knowledge, sc. knowledge representing me going-to-sit when I am not going-to-sit. In the same way, I argue about any given human; and consequently, from the fact that God made [*causavit*] Scripture in order to make humans certain about thing[s], it does not follow that Scripture is true, and only by this [reasoning] is it authentic, therefore etc., it [is] at least in my power that the consequence not be valid.

22. Secondly, it follows from that proposition that it is in the power of any human to act so that God should in no way be believed, since He should not be believed unless all knowledge which he causes to make a human certain about something is true; for if one such [item of knowledge] is false, this [human] would be deceived, and consequently [God] should not be believed. But if every true proposition about the past is necessary, then it is in the power of any human to make God cause false knowledge for the purpose of making a human certain about something, just as has been deduced in the previous argument.

23. Third, it follows that that it is in the power of any human to deceive God, since [the following consequence] is valid: “The divine knowledge represented Peter as going-to-deny Christ; therefore Peter was going-to-deny Christ.” It was in Peter’s power that the consequent be false, and thus that God would be deceived. Thus I argue about any given human.

24. Fourth, it follows that it is in the power of any given human to act so that God could not make a human certain about a future contingent, since He cannot make anyone certain except by some knowledge that He would cause in order to make him certain. But it is in power of any [human] to act so that someone is not made certain by such knowledge; for let the following consequence hold: “God caused this knowledge in order to make me certain about my future sitting, therefore I was going-to-sit”; it is in the power of the human that the consequent be false, and the antecedent is necessary according to you; therefore it is in the

human's power that the consequence not be valid, and that the antecedent be true without the consequent; and consequently, it is in the human's power that nobody be made certain, by that antecedent, about the consequent. Thus must it be argued for any given human.

25. Fifth, it follows that it is in the power of a human that the [proposition] "God knows something false" be true. For [the following consequence] is valid: "God knows that *a* will be, therefore *a* will be." It is in the power of a human that the consequent be false, and the antecedent is, according to you, necessary; therefore it is in the power of a human that the consequence not be valid, and consequently that the antecedent be true without the consequent, and thus that the [proposition] "God knows that *a* will be, and *a* will not be" be true; and consequently that the [proposition] "God knows something false" be true, which¹⁵ incurs a contradiction.

26. Sixth, it follows that it is in the power of a human to make contradictories be true, sc. that some proposition about the future should have been true, and [that] it should never have been true. For [the following argument] is valid: "This proposition was true: 'Peter was going to deny Christ'; therefore it was actually going-to-be [*sic fuit futurum in re*]." It [was] in Peter's power that the consequent should have been false, and the antecedent is necessary according to you, therefore it was in Peter's power that the consequence not have been valid, and consequently that that proposition should have been true, and nevertheless that it not have been going-to-be thus in actuality [*et tamen quod non fuisset sic futurum in re*]; therefore it was in Peter's power that it should have been true that that proposition be true when it was not true.

27. Seventh, in all these ways we can argue [*contingit arguere*] about the divine will. First, that it is in a human's power to make the divine will be unjust, since [the following consequence] is valid: "God willed some punishment for Peter for his future denial, therefore that denial was going-to-be." It was in Peter's power that the consequent be false, and the antecedent was necessary according to you, therefore it was in Peter's power that the antecedent be true without the consequent, and consequently that [God] should have willed, for Peter, a punishment for a sin of commission, which sin Peter neither committed nor was to commit; which would be unjust.

28. From the same it follows that it is in a human's power that we cannot argue [as follows]: "God wills this, therefore this is good"; and secondly, that it is in a human's power that God cannot make a human justly will a punishment to someone for a future sin, nor [will] glory [to someone] for future merit; for [the following consequence] is valid: "God made this one will blessedness to Socrates for his future merit, therefore Socrates will deserve [it]." It is in Socrates' power that the consequent be false. Therefore, if the antecedent is necessary, then it is in Socrates' power that the antecedent be true without the consequent, and consequently that this one, in willing blessedness to Socrates, should have willed unjustly.

29. These, and many other absurdities, follow from the position discussed above, which posits that every true proposition about the past is necessary, since it follows infallibly follows that it is in the power of a creature to deceive the divine intellect, and indeed [to make] the divine will unjust, from which two [results] follow many other evils.

[Third opinion:]

¹⁵ Reading *quod* for Wey and Etzkorn's *quia*.

30. In the third mode, it is said that every true proposition about the past which depends on a future contingent is contingently true, since every such [proposition] is equivalent to a copulative whose second part is a proposition about a future contingent; as [for example] the [proposition] “Christ said that Peter would deny him” is equivalent to the copulative “Christ uttered those words, and it was going-to-be just as those words signified.” And thus although the consequence is necessary, nevertheless the antecedent is contingent, thus the conclusion is contingent.¹⁶

[Against the third opinion:]

31. Against. Given this, it would follow that after you have killed a human, it would be in your power that you would not have killed him, since let it be posited, as it was posited in the fourth principal doubt, that God not permit you to kill anyone unless you would be finally good. According to you, it is not in your power that that consequence not hold; therefore, according to you, the antecedent is contingent, and consequently it is then in your power that the antecedent never have been true. In the same way, it follows that after you have constructed a house, it be in your power never to have constructed a house, and thus about similar [matters]. In the same way, if God would only have created the world on the condition that all humans be saved, it would now be in the power of any human who was going-to-be-saved that the world never have been created. Which [results] are absurd.

32. Second, given this [=30], an infinite regress would follow, since if a proposition about the past and dependent on the future be demonstrated, it is either equivalent to a copulative, or not. If not, we have what we proposed. If so, the second part of that copulative is still a true [proposition] about the past; either it is equivalent to a copulative, or not. If not, we have what we proposed. If so, it must be argued as previously, and so to infinity.

[Final response to the question:]

33. Therefore it seems that [the problem] must be solved differently [*aliter ponendum*]. For it seems, from what has been said, that the second opinion [=20] posits that *every* true proposition about the past, even [one that] depends on the future, is necessary; and that the third opinion [=30] posits that *no* true proposition about the past [and] dependent on the future is necessary, but that any such [proposition] is contingent. To me, however, it seems that some true propositions about the future which nevertheless depend on future contingents are necessary, and that some are contingent. It must be noted that one [kind of] true proposition about the past or the present, dependent on a future contingent, is such that in no way, by any power,¹⁷ can it be true without [that] future contingent; as [for example] this proposition: “The divine cognition represented Peter as going-to-deny Christ; therefore, the [following] proposition was true: “Peter will deny Christ.” However, another [kind of] true proposition about the past or the present, dependent on a future contingent, is such that it can be true by some power, although that contingent will never have been going-to-be. Nevertheless, since according to common law [the proposition] cannot be true without the contingent being [really going to happen in the future] [*sine. . . fuerit*], or at least it is not *in fact* true without

¹⁶ This is a version of Chatton’s Copulative Analysis, for which see Keele and Pelletier 2018 §6.2 and Bornholdt 2017: 183-187. It resembles the version taken over by Robert Holcot; see *ibid.*, 260-262.

¹⁷ Reading *ullam potentiam* for Wey and Etzkorn’s *nullam potentiam*; but of course this could be the Middle English double negative seeping through Chatton’s Latin.

that contingent being [really going to happen in the] future, therefore it is said to be dependent on a future contingent; similarly [with] the proposition “You have killed a human,” on the assumption [*posito*] that God would not permit you to kill someone if you were not going to be damned; and the proposition “You have constructed a material church,” on the assumption that God would not permit you to build a material church for yourself if you are not finally good.

34. Assuming this distinction, I posit two rules about a true proposition about the present and the past that depends on a future contingent. The first rule is: If by no power it is possible that a proposition about the present or the past is [*fuert*] true unless such a contingent were [*fuert*] true, that proposition about the present or the past must be posited as contingently true until the instant or time at which that contingent is posited in being; if [for example] it is by no power possible that the proposition “the divine cognition represents Peter as going-to-deny Christ” will have been true unless the proposition “Peter will deny Christ” will have been true, [then] just as it was possible for the latter to be false until the positing-in-being of the denial, so also [it was possible for] the former [to be false]. For this consequence is so necessary that it cannot be impeded by any power: “The divine cognition represented Peter as going-to-deny Christ, therefore Peter was going-to-deny Christ”; and consequently, it was possible for [the consequent] to be false before Peter’s denial; therefore [also] the antecedent. [Second rule:] It is clear that the consequence is necessary in this way, since if by any power it was possible for a true proposition about the present or past which depends on a future [contingent] to be true without that contingent eventually coming to be [*sine hoc quod . . . fuert futurum*], it ought not to be posited that that true proposition about the present or past is contingent, since in order to save the contingency of the conclusion, it suffices to posit that the consequence is contingent. Examples are given in the solutions to the arguments.

[On the first doubt:]

35. On the first principal argument [=1] it must be said that it does not follow from the question that God cannot annihilate this wayfarer. – On the proof, when it is argued “This one was certain that this charity will be perpetuated, therefore this one will not be annihilated,” it can be said that the consequence is necessary, and the antecedent is contingent, since if he was certain in judging thus, then the future was truly the way he judged it.

36. And on the proof, it must be said that a true proposition about the past, which cannot be true about the past except under some future contingent condition, it is possible for it never to have been true, and it will be possible in this way until the positing-in-being of that contingent.

[On the second doubt:]

37. To the second principal [argument] [=2] it can perhaps be said that it is a contradiction for God to cause a false proposition in the mind without revealing it to be false, nor a false assent without immediately revealing that assent to have been false; not on the grounds that such a false assent cannot be made without such a subsequent revelation, but because it would detract from the truth and authority of God that this be done by Him, [since if this] were done, God could not by any means be believed, and thus divine authority would be totally lost.

38. Nevertheless, since many modern writers [*multi hodie*] posit that God can cause false propositions and false assent in a human’s mind, therefore I defer the above response to

another time, and I posit now a way in which the second argument can be solved, and the following arguments [as well]. If it be held that God can cause false assent and false propositions [in a human's mind], whether this be true or false, it would be said then that the consequence made in the argument is contingent, and that it is possible for the antecedent to be true without the consequent, and that it is possible that God cause a false proposition. However, it seems that this can be understood in two ways. In one way, [it can be understood] that that proposition is false which [God] causes in the mind of someone in order to make that one certain about a future thing, event, or state of affairs [*de re futura*], in such a way that that proposition is false when God, by means of it, wants to make a human certain about some future contingent event; and this is not possible, just as it is not possible that He Himself be deceived. In another way, [it can be understood] that [God] causes a false proposition through which He does *not* want to make anyone's mind certain about the thing, event, or state of affairs; and thus it would be said to be quite possible that He can make an absolute thing [*rem absolutam*] which a creature can make, especially if it is not a sin.

[Three objections against the aforesaid]

39. Against this. If this is possible in the second way, let it be thus posited in being. Then the absurdities discussed above regarding the second opinion [=21–29] will follow.

40. Secondly, then it will follow as above [=2, 10, 20] that God can deceive humans and lie.

41. Thirdly, how can it be certain to a creature to whom a revelation has been made that [God] intends by that proposition to make that [creature] certain about that thing, event, or state of affairs? This cannot be made certain to him by the same proposition, as is clear; nor should [we assume that] [God] would another proposition in order to make the creature certain, since in the same way it must be asked how he is made certain about that [proposition], and thus to infinity; nor are there any other signs by which a creature can be made certain; therefore, etc.

[Response to these three objections:]

42. To the first of these [=39] it should be said that it is possible that God cause a false proposition, provided He does not will, through that [act of] causation, to make a creature certain about the signified thing, event, or state of affairs.

43. And on the proof, it must be said that if this possibility is posited in being, the absurdities adduced above against the second opinion [=21–29] do not follow. First, it does not follow from this that Scripture is [not] authentic, since [Scripture] itself is revealed by acts by which [God] wanted to make humans certain about the matters signified; and from such revelation [this consequence] follows infallibly: “This has been revealed by God by a revelation by which He wanted to make humans certain about the truth [*de vero*], therefore it is true.” Nor, secondly, does it follow that God cannot be believed, especially in any revelation by which He intends to make a human certain about the truth; and [I would argue] thus about the other [absurdities].

44. On the second [objection] [=40] it must be said, just as it is commonly said, that it does not follow that God can lie, since “to lie” is “to say a falsehood that one is obliged by conscience not to say.” In the same way, if “to deceive” is the same as “to make someone else believe something false against one's own conscience,” then it does not follow that God could

deceive anyone. If, however, “to deceive” is the same as “to make someone else believe a falsehood in any way at all,” then it would be said otherwise.

45. On the third [objection] [=41], it must be said that about any proposition and any assent caused by God, it must be perceived that that [assent or proposition] is true and that it is caused in order to make the creature certain of the truth, unless the opposite is clear in some way, since [God] does not deceive anyone, nor, by common law, *can* he deceive anyone; therefore, when God causes a proposition or any belief in the mind of a human, and it is clear that God causes it, then it must be firmly held that God, through it, wants to make the human certain about the truth.

46. Moreover, there are various ways by which we can come to know whether God, by that utterance, wants to make the human certain about the truth of a thing, event, or state of affairs; sometimes by the way of revelation, sometimes by supporting miracles, sometimes by punishments and rewards of the believers and disbelievers, sometimes by the carrying out of a predicted fact, and by many other ways; indeed, as many are the ways of the divine will, as we have shown in other matters, so many ways can there be in the matter here proposed.

47. In order to confirm the second argument [=2]: To the consequence “God made this one believe that his charity will be perpetuated by a belief by which He wanted to make him certain by the truth of the thing, therefore this human will not be annihilated”—it must be said that the antecedent is contingent until the determination of the thing and not necessary, since otherwise it would have been possible that then [=for the moment described by the antecedent] God should have been deceived.

[On the third doubt:]

48. On the third principal argument [=3] it can be said that it does not follow, from that part of the question, that [the human] cannot sin. – And on the proof, sc. with respect to the consequence then adduced [*ulteriore*], when it is argued: “This one said to his neighbor, ‘I have perpetual charity,’ therefore he has perpetual charity”—it can be said that the consequent is contingent and that after this the preceding utterance was false; not, however, because in thus speaking [the human] had been without charity or had sinned mortally, since after that utterance this [proposition] was necessary: “This one spoke in conformity with his conscience.”

49. Against: This one would not have spoken thus unless he had been certain about perpetual charity. – It must be said that this is true, but nevertheless contingently true; therefore it does not prove that the consequence is necessary.

[On the fourth doubt:]

50. On the fourth principal argument [=4], it must be said that if that case is posited, the consequence “You have killed that unbelieving human, therefore you have had perpetual charity” was contingently valid. – And on the proof, it must be said that that conditional is true according to the [following] case: “If you had not had perpetual charity, you would not have killed him”; however, it is contingently true; therefore it does not prove that the consequence is necessary.

51. Against: I wish that it be held to be necessary. – It must be said that then I am obliged to concede that the first consequence is necessary, and consequently to posit that the consequent is necessary or the antecedent contingent.

[On the fifth doubt:]

52. On the fifth principal argument [=5], the antecedent must be denied. For there is no contradiction in assuming [*bene enim potuerunt stare simul*] that Peter, before his denial, could have been certain that he would deny Christ, and nevertheless that it was in his power not to deny him.

53. And on the proof it must be said that he would have been certain that he would be morally bound to resist the denial [*debuisset noluisse negationem illam*] for the [predicted] place and time; but from this it does not follow that he would have denied unwillingly, since [the following consequence] is not valid: “This one was morally bound to resist the denial for the [predicted] time and place, therefore he resisted for that time and place”; indeed, just as he would have been certain that he would sin in denying Christ, so he would have been certain that he sinned in omitting to resist that denial for the time and place in which he was supposed to [resist it].

[On the sixth doubt: The opinion of others:]

54. On the sixth principal argument [=6], some posit that it is a contradiction that an angel, before any sin, should foreknow his own fall. First, since in foreknowing, he will suffer from a pain which would restrain him from the sin, just as has been discussed in the previous argument [=53]; second, because in that case, before any sin, he would be miserable, since afflicted by sadness, as Anselm argues,¹⁸ and as is briefly discussed below [=57]; this seems to contradict divine mercy. Third, since then, before any sin, he would despair of his own salvation, just as is discussed below in the eighth argument [=68].

[Against this opinion:]

55. However, it must be said that there is no contradiction. For Anselm’s argument seems to prove that one angel could not foreknow the fall of another. Therefore it seems necessary to say that Anselm, in that passage as in many others, proceeds by disputing, investigating and by adducing [merely] probable arguments; for it is not in accordance with the thinking of anyone truly speaking that such arguments are demonstrations. And therefore [when] Anselm writes some words which seem to sound like approval of such things, as [for example] that a human being could not perceive [matters] otherwise, and such like, it seems that he says such things in a disputatious [spirit], as is often the case in such disputations.

56. Therefore to this argument of Anselm it must be said that if we posit this case, that angel can resist his own future fall.

57. And when it is said that then he would be miserable, indeed the more just, the more miserable, it must be said that by assuming the misery of punishment strictly for a punishment which is not in the power of the one suffering it, the consequence is not valid, since that pain would be in the power of that sufferer. Hence, a good angel, who would not [finally] be

¹⁸ See reference in [6] – [7].

blessed, could without any sin suffer for the sin of a human, [and] nevertheless he would not be miserable from any punishment inflicted on him which would not be in his power. Nevertheless, by taking “misery of punishment” broadly as “any affliction in general,” the conclusion must be conceded. For such affliction and misery of punishment can be just, since a good angel, who would not [finally] be blessed, can justly grieve over human sin; and if the human had not sinned, *something* could have happened against his just will; for such affliction would be in the power of the one afflicted, therefore it is not properly called the misery of punishment.

[On the arguments mentioned above:]

58. Therefore, as to the first argument of the opinion [=54], [the solution] is clear in the solution of the preceding argument [=52–53]. It can be conceded that that angel, in foreknowing his own fall, could and should grieve with a pain that restrains him from the sin; nevertheless, he would omit that pain for the time in which he sinned.

59. On the second [=54], we have already spoken [=57], since [the angel] would not be miserable by a misery of punishment inflicted on him unwillingly; however, he would be afflicted by a just affliction, caused freely.

60. On the third [=54], it will be clarified in the eighth argument [=68, the response to the eighth doubt].

61. To confirm the sixth principal argument [=7], when it is said that in foreknowing his fall, he either thinks about that future fall voluntarily, or not [voluntarily]; it must be said that [he does it] voluntarily, and that it would be possible for him to avoid that sin. But from this it does not follow that he does not know whether he will avoid it in fact or not, since he foreknows that he will not avoid it.

62. Therefore [the solution] to the sixth argument [=6] is clear, since the assumption is denied, when it is assumed that the wayfarer cannot be certain of his own perpetual fall.

[On the seventh doubt:]

63. On the seventh principal argument [=8], [the solution] is clear by what has already been said, since by common law, every punishment inflicted which is not in the power of a human, if it is just, is a punishment of sin. However, the pain in the case at hand is not such a punishment [of sin]; nevertheless, it is a punishment of preconceived sin; for one [person], if he were to have a certain cognition [*habita certa consideratione*] about [his own] future sin, would suffer from a just pain freely caused, just as another suffers freely from the past sin of another.

[On the eighth doubt: The opinion of others:]

64. On the eighth principal argument,¹⁹ the opinion of others is that an angel, foreknowing his own fall, would not necessarily despair, since foreknowing one’s fall and despairing of blessedness are two diverse acts, and God can influence [the angel] to the one while not influencing him to the other.

¹⁹ Lacking in text.

[Against this opinion:]

65. But this is not relevant to the matter at hand, since the argument proceeds, if we suppose the general influence of God.

[Another opinion:]

66. Others say that it is not then in the power of that angel that he not despair, but then that despair would not be a sin for him, since it would not be in his power that he not believe that he would not have blessedness.

[Against this opinion:]

67. Against: to believe this is not to believe the truth, therefore it is not despair.

[Chatton's response to the eighth doubt:]

68. Therefore it can be said that [the following consequence] is not valid: "This one foreknows that he will be damned, therefore he will despair." For *to hope* is to believe that if one does what one can, one will have blessedness, and *to despair* is to believe that even if one does what one can, one will [not] have blessedness. Therefore, although an angel whose own future fall has been revealed to him would believe that he would not be saved, nevertheless from this it does not follow that he would despair, since *to despair* is not the same as *to believe that one will not be saved*, since he who believes that he will die in mortal sin believes that he will not be saved, and nevertheless he believes that if he does what he can, he will be saved; therefore he does not despair of the mercy of God.

[On the ninth doubt:]

69. On the ninth principal argument [=10], it can be conceded that someone can be made certain about his own perseverance in the good. But from this it does not follow that he himself would be made certain that he cannot sin. And when it is said that his perseverance cannot be lost, it must be said that if this proposition be taken in the composed sense, the proposition is true; for this proposition is not possible: "[final] perseverance is lost," as the argument proves. However, it must be noted that perseverance is taken in one way, in the sense of willing to persevere, and thus it is not taken in the matter at hand; in another way, [it is taken] for continuous virtue without interruption, and it is taken thus in the argument.

[On the tenth doubt:]

70. On the tenth principal argument [=10], it must be said that a human can be made certain about the truth of a future contingent in many ways: in one way, by a vision by which he thinks that he sees, in the divine essence, that it will be thus; in another way, by propositions which God causes in the created mind; in a third [way], by an assent which God causes in the created mind, whether that assent is by an act of belief or by an act of evident cognition.

71. And when it is argued that any of these [visions, propositions, or assents] can exist with respect to a falsehood, it can be said that it is not possible according to disposed law that God

would cause these things, and nevertheless that they be false, unless He had revealed them to be false.

72. Nevertheless, perhaps it is not a contradiction that some vision of the divine essence be caused by which it would appear to a creature that he see, in the divine essence, *a* as going-to-be, and nevertheless that it not be thus in actual truth. Perhaps it is even not a contradiction that God might cause, in a created mind, a false proposition or even a firm assent with respect to something false. Whence it is a contradiction that God might cause, in a created mind, some vision about the truth of a future [contingent], and nevertheless that it be false.

73. To the argument, it must therefore be said that a human can be made certain about his future perpetual charity in both ways. And on the proof [=10], it must be said that the following consequence is not valid: “God can cause a false proposition and a false assent, therefore He cannot make a mind certain about a future contingent event.” For this consequence is not valid; first, because it is not possible that God would want to instruct the created mind about the truth by a false proposition or a false assent, and thus [the wayfarer] can be made certain by propositions by which God wants to make him certain; second, because although it is perhaps not a contradiction that God might cause such false things, nevertheless it is not possible according to currently instituted laws, and thus according to those [laws] it is enough for someone to be made certain in either of the aforesaid ways. Therefore, if God cause some assent or proposition in someone’s mind, so that it would be clear to him that God has caused that proposition or assent, it must be firmly believed that that assent is true, and similarly [with a] proposition, as has been said above [=37–38].

[On the eleventh doubt:]

74. To the eleventh principal argument [=11], it can be said that the consequence is necessary, and the antecedent is contingent. And on the proof it must be said that not all true propositions about the past which depend on the future, equally contingent, [are equally necessary or non-necessary]. For some depend on a future contingent in such a way that it is a contradiction for it to be true unless that [contingent] be going-to-be; as such propositions: “God knew that *a* would be,” “God willed that *a* would be,” “God represented *a* as going-to-be,” “this was true: ‘*a* will be’”, and thus for similar [examples]. However, some [true] propositions about the past depend on a future contingent in such a way that they can, without contradiction, be true without that contingent being going-to-be; as such propositions: “You have killed a human,” “You have built a house,” “God caused such a proposition,” “Christ said that *a* would be,” and such like.

[On the twelfth doubt.]

75. On the twelfth argument [=12], it can be conceded according to what has been said that after Christ’s utterance it was in Peter’s power that Christ’s utterance have been false. And on the first proof it can be said that the following consequence is not valid: “It was in Peter’s power that the utterance of Christ have been false, therefore it is possible in accordance with currently instituted law that Christ should have said something false,” since the law now instituted is the will of God by which God now wills that things happen thus or thus. Since therefore God does not will nor ever willed that Christ should speak a falsehood, therefore according to law [now] instituted he cannot speak a falsehood.

76. Against: It was in Peter's power that Christ should have spoken a falsehood, since it [was] in Peter's power that there have been another instituted law from [the one that] prevails now, since, according to you, according to law now instituted, Christ cannot speak a falsehood. – It can be conceded that it was in Peter's power that the divine will should have had something for its object that it did not have for its object; and thus it was in Peter's power that there have been another law by distinction [*alietati*] of the willed object, though not by distinction of the will.

77. On the second proof [=12]. The proposition "It is possible that a proposition by which God wills to make a human certain about the truth be false" must be distinguished according to composition and division. The composed sense is this: "This is possible, 'That proposition by which God wants to make a human certain about the truth is false'," and this sense is false, nor does it follow from the antecedent. The divided sense is this: "By that proposition, God wills to make a human certain about the truth, and that proposition can be false," and this sense can be conceded; not because God simultaneously wills by that [proposition] to make a human certain [about the truth], and nevertheless that then it be false—that is the composed sense, and it is false—but that God now, in fact, might make a human certain by it, and nevertheless that it could have been false; it is no contradiction [*simul enim stant*] that God might make a human certain by it now and in fact, and nevertheless [that] He is able not to make the human certain by it; thus it is no contradiction that God should in fact make a human certain by it, and nevertheless that it be capable of being false.

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